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Writing Race and Identity in a Global Context:
What CRT and TWAIL Can Learn From Each Other
James Thuo Gathii

ABSTRACT
This Article argues that issues ofrace and identity have so far been underemphasized, understudied,
and undertheorized in mainstream international law. To address this major gap, this Article
argues that there is an opportunity for learning, sharing, and collaboration between Critical Race
Theorists (CRT) and scholars of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). Such
a collaboration, this Article argues, would produce a very sharp lens of tracing issues of race
and identity in the imperial, transnational, and global histories of international law and their
contemporary continuities. By adopting a framework of studying race and identity in a global
context, this Article will tie together and connect the domestic and the international. It will
connect transnational histories between locations inside and outside the United States that have
undergirded and reinforced White supremacism, as well as anticolonial resistance, domestically
and internationally. Taking such an approach overcomes the wide variety of segregated and insular
conceptualizations and definitions of race and identity within CRT and TWAIL respectively.
Building a TWAIL/CRT global/transnational race/histories project will create productive
insights about ideologies of racial domination and racial injustices in a domestic, international,
and transnational context. By combining the insights of CRT and TWAIL, it becomes possible
to theorize imperialism and racism beyond those currently embodied in each approach.
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INTRODUCTION

Scholars of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) trace
the juristic techniques that justified colonial conquest along the axes of
European/non-European,
colonizer/colonized,
civilized/uncivilized,
and
modernity/tradition. For Critical Race Theorists (CRT), by contrast, race is the
central analytic category for understanding how domestic law, racist science, and
literature have for generations justified the dehumanization and discrimination of
African Americans.1 While TWAIL scholars focus on how European expansion
and exploitation of non-European peoples constructed an imperial international
law, CRT scholars focus on how Whiteness as a normative reference point has
defined the legacy of White entitlement and the subordination and oppression
of African Americans, but also other non-White people.2
This Article argues that there is an opportunity for learning, sharing, and
collaboration between CRT and TWAIL scholars. Both reject linear progress as
having overcome slavery and colonialism.3 Both expose the discursive and
material continuities and discontinuities of Jim Crow and imperial international
law. And both critique the continuity of the ideology that non-Whites/nonEuropeans belong to an inferior subhuman race in their respective fields. For
example, CRT scholars do this by showing how the U.S. Supreme Court has
constitutionalized racial inequality.4 TWAIL scholars do this by showing how

1

2.
3.

4.

See Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1369 (1988) ("The
failure ... to consider race in their account of law and legitimacy is not a minor oversight: race
consciousness is central not only to the domination of Blacks, but also to whites' acceptance of
the legitimacy of hierarchy and to their identity with elite interest. Exposing the centrality of
race consciousness is crucial to identifying and delegitimating beliefs that present hierarchy as
inevitable and fair. Moreover, exposing the centrality of race consciousness shows how the
options of Blacks in American society have been limited, and how the use of rights rhetoric has
emancipated Blacks from some manifestations of racial domination.").
See id.
For CRT, see id. at 1333 ("[F]ocus on the continuing disparities between Blacks and whites
might call, not for celebration, but for strident criticism of America's failure to make good on
its promise of racial equality."). For TWAIL, see James Thuo Gathii, Decolonising
InternationalLaw: Development, Economic Growth and the Politicsof Universalityby Sundhya
Pahuja, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 494, 498 (2013) (book review) (noting that "notwithstanding
guarantees of sovereign equality and self-determination, post-World War II reforms
continued the legacy of imperialism and Eurocentricism within international law").
See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, Doctrines of Delusion: How the History of the GI. Bill and Other
Inconvenient Truths Undermine the Supreme Court's Affirmative Action Jurisprudence,75 U.
PITT. L. REv. 583,650 (2014) ("Affirmative action was originally conceived as a remedy for past
race discrimination against [B]lacks and other minorities. Yet instead of upholding the
voluntary efforts of universities, localities and the federal government to provide some remedy
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rules of international law institutionalize the colonizer/colonized legacy in their
basic doctrines and institutional forms.' Both embody a commitment to reform
of law while recognizing the dangers of legal retrenchment of racism and
colonialism.
Yet, CRT and TWAIL scholars have not consistently collaborated to explore
how White superiority justified not just slavery and Jim Crow, but colonial
conquest around the world as well. Domestic U.S. law was constructed on
assumptions that White identity embodied the ideal expression of humanity, in
terms of morality, progress, and civilization. Likewise, imperial international
law was constructed on the basis of White racial superiority-as rational
stewards of the territories of non-Europeans-and on the basis of racist myths of
indigenous savagery, primitivism, and pathology. 6 Hence, just as slavery
dehumanized Blacks as degenerate and outside the boundaries of humanity in the
construction of the United States as a White racial state, European/White
international law was constructed to relegate non-European peoples who were
considered to live outside the bounds of humanity and therefore outside of
sovereignty.' A TWAIL lens also pierces through the myth that the United States's
nineteenth century colonial possessions over Puerto Rico and the Philippines,
among others, did not constitute imperialism, but a type of democratic tutelage.'
American intellectuals, politicians, and businesspeople of the period argued that

5.

for our history of race discrimination, the [Supreme] Court has, with the exception of Grutter,
uniformly rejected and even disparaged such efforts."). Juan Perea then concludes that "[t]his
is what the evidence shows. We should trust the evidence, not the rhetoric. We should see the
Court not as a court of justice or equality, but rather as a primary def ender of white privilege
and racial inequality." Id. at 651.
In discussing the mandate system of the League of Nations, Antony Anghie concludes that "we
might see in both the Mandate System and in its successors, the BWI [Bretton Woods
Institutions], the reproduction of the basis premises of the civilizing mission and the
dynamic of difference embodied in the very structure, logic and identity of international
institutions."
ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 193 (2004).

6.

7.

8.

Id. at 101-02 (showing "the process by which non-European states are deemed to be lacking
in sovereignty and hence excluded from the family of nations and of law; and the racialization
of the vocabulary of the period, in terms not only of the explicit distinctions between civilized
and uncivilized, advanced and barbaric, but in terms of the integration of these distinctions
into the very foundations of the discipline").
Id. at 103 ("Sovereignty was therefore aligned with European ideas of social order, political
organization, progress and development.... [i]n contrast, lacking sovereignty, non-European
states exercised no rights recognizable by international law over their own territory.").
See generally JULIAN GO, AMERICAN EMPIRE AND THE POLITICS OF MEANING: ELITE POLITICAL
CULTURE IN THE PHILIPPINES AND PUERTO RICO DURING U.S. COLONIALISM (2008) (arguing that

the United States had a policy of tutelage under which the inhabitants of the United States'
colonial possessions could be taught to build and maintain democracy as a condition for being
granted self-government).
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the direct domination of the "lesser races" by the "superior races" was inevitable.'
The boundaries of CRT have expanded beyond the Black-White binary to focus
on the racialized dehumanization and discrimination of Latina/os and Asian
Americans, as well as Arabs and Muslims. 10
This Article proposes to leverage the lenses that CRT provides to understand
race in domestic law and the tools TWAIL provides to understand imperialism in
international law. By adopting a framework of studying race and identity in a
global context, this Article will tie together and connect the domestic and the
international. It will connect transnational histories between locations inside
and outside the United States that have undergirded and reinforced White
supremacism, as well as anticolonial resistance, domestically and internationally.
Taking such an approach overcomes the wide variety of segregated and insular
conceptualizations and definitions of race and identity within CRT and TWAIL
respectively. Building a TWAIL/CRT global/transnational race/histories project
will create productive insights so that TWAIL scholars can see more sharply how
ideologies of racial domination are a source of national injustices, and CRT
scholars can more clearly see how imperial history is-like racism-a source of
transnational racial injustices. By combining the insights of CRT and TWAIL, it

9.

10.

Julian Go, American ColonialEmpire: The Limit ofPower's Reach, ITEMS & IssuEs, Fall/Winter
2003, at 18, 18 (arguing that "[i]mmediately after the Spanish-American war, countless
intellectuals, statesmen, and colonial officials made haste to claim that overseas empireand more specifically, the direct domination of the 'lesser races' by the 'superior races'was inevitable. The inevitability arose not from the threat of terrorism but from the forces
of increased globalism and presumptions of racial superiority").
See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The "NormalScience" of
American Racial Thought, 85 CALIF. L. REv. 1213, 1215 (1998); LAURA E. GOMEZ, MANIFEST
DESTINIES: THE MAKING OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN RACE (2007) (showing how Mexican

Americans have been constructed as a race); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifteenth Chronicle:
RacialMixture, Latino-CriticalScholarship,and the Black- White Binary,75 TEX. L. REv. 1181,
1189 (1997) (reviewing LOUISE ANN FISCH, ALL RISE: REYNALDO G. GARZA, THE FIRST

MEXICAN AMERICAN FEDERAL JUDGE (1996)), (arguing that the Black-White binary excludes
non-White groups that fall outside its purview); Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Out of the Shadow:
MarkingIntersectionsin and Between Asian PacificAmerican CriticalLegalScholarshipand
Latina/o Critical Legal Theory, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 349, 352 (1998) [hereinafter
Iglesias, Out of the Shadow] (discussing the contributions APACrit/LatCrit crossfertilizations can make toward the articulation of a broader and more inclusive framework
for the production of outsider scholarship and coalitional politics and therefore can "shed
new light on structures and processes of domination, whose logic, histories and modes of
operation might otherwise remain invisible"). On the importance of international law for
LatCrit theory, see Elizabeth M. Iglesias, International Law, Human Rights, and LatCrit
Theory, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 177 (1996) [hereinafter Iglesias, InternationalLaw].
On racialization of Arab and Muslim people, see Sunita Patel, PerformativeAspects of Race:
"Arab,Muslim, and South Asian" Racial FormationAfter September 11, 10 UCLA ASIAN PAC.
AM. L.J. 61 (2005).
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becomes possible to theorize imperialism and racism beyond those insights
currently embodied in each approach."
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the convergences and
divergences in the agendas of CRT and TWAIL with respect to how they discuss
race and identity. Part II explores how the analytical tools of CRT-racial
subordination, intersectionality, multidimensionality, and anti-essentialismcan be used to better amplify and illuminate new directions in TWAIL and CRT
scholarship. In discussing how an antisubordination lens could better illuminate
certain TWAIL themes, the Article uses the example of an international judicial
decision from Southern Africa that found that White farmers had been
discriminated against because the Constitution of Zimbabwe had authorized
the seizure of their land in favor of Black farmers.12 The discussion on
intersectionality focuses on TWAIL and TWAIL-inspired feminist and LGBT
scholarship and its relationship with insights from CRT. The Article discusses
how multidimensionality could inform TWAIL analysis of multiple bases of
subordination to include that of indigenous peoples. In discussing essentialism
and antiessentialism, the Article argues that the use of the term Third World in
TWAIL can be defended on the grounds that conceding to claims that it is
essentialist would inhibit innovative antisubordination analysis of the
international legal order. Part III then discusses payoffs for CRT that could arise
from applying TWAIL's analytical methods to probe the United States as a
colonial power with respect to Puerto Rico. In addition, it explores how TWAIL
could help CRT uncover the imperial nature of the United States and how these
insights might be expanded to include examining the racialization of U.S. foreign
relations law.

11.

12.

Learning from other collaborations among critical movements demonstrates that
collaboration does not mean TWAIL or CRT losing their respective identities. See Iglesias, Out
of the Shadow,, supra note 10, at 351 (discussing the contributions Asian Pacific American
critical legal scholarship and Latina/o critical legal theory cross-fertilizations can make toward
the articulation of a broader and more inclusive framework for the production of outsider
scholarship and coalitional politics, therefore "shed[ding] new light on structures and
processes of domination, whose logic, histories and modes of operation might otherwise
remain invisible"). On the importance of international law for Latina/o critical legal theory, see
generally Iglesias, International Law, supra note 10.
Campbell v. Republic of Zim 2008 (2) SADCT 2 (S. Afr.) http://www.saflii.org/sa/cases/
SADCT/2008/2.html [https://perma.cc/9EYC-D45L].
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I.

CONVERGENCES IN HOW CRT AND TWAIL DISCUSS
RACE AND IDENTITY

TWAIL has been in existence just over two decades now, and CRT for just
over three decades.13 Both started off marginalizedin their respective disciplines,"
but each has slowly grown into full-fledged scholarly movements, though still
regarded with a measure of skepticism in the mainstream of their disciplines." As
I noted above, there is much common ground between CRT and TWAIL. Both
share a common point of departure-deeply skeptical and critical of the
mainstream position in their respective fields-from the idea that that European
modernity for TWAIL and Whiteness for CRT are neutral, universal, and raceless
baselines of which non-Europeans for TWAIL and Black people for CRT fall
short. 16 Under these assumptions, non-Europeans have ethnic, cultural, and
traditional attachments, and they should aspire towards European modernity
that is presumed neutral and universal. Like much of domestic law, mainstream
international lawyers ignore or underplay international law's role in past and

1 3.

14.

15.

16.

For a recent analysis of their first few decades, see generally Devon W. Carbado, CriticalWhat
What?, 43 CONN. L. REv. 1593 (2011); James Thuo Gathii, The Agenda of Third World
Approaches to InternationalLaw (TWAIL), in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS
AND FRONTIERS (Jeffrey Dunoff& Mark Pollack eds., forthcoming 2021).
One example of this marginalization arose in 1999 when the American Journal of
International Law published a symposium on method in international law. Critical
approaches like TWAIL were omitted. Henry Richardson wrote to the co-editors-in-chief
of that journal that he:
was sadly disappointed that critical race theory/Latino critical legal theory
(CRT/LCT) was omitted totally from that discussion, even to the absence of a
single footnote. That omission crucially distorts the symposium by ignoring the
emergence in the last two decades of new approaches to international law, based
on determinations by people of color that in order to erase embedded systematic
discrimination they must become jurisprudential producers and not merely
remain jurisprudential consumers.
Henry J. Richardson III, Letter to the Editor, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 99, 99 (2000). For another
recounting of this episode, see Jeanne M. Woods, Introduction:TheoreticalInsights From the
CuttingEdge, 104 AM. SOCY INT'L L. 389 (2010). In part because of Richardson's intervention,
when a book on method in international law arising from that symposium was published,
a contribution from Bhupinder Chimni and Antony Anghie, two TWAIL scholars, was
included. See generally Antony Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to
InternationalLaw and Individual Responsibility in InternalConflicts, 2 CHINESE J. INT'L L.
77 (2003).
For CRT, see Carbado, supra note 13. For TWAIL, see Gathii, supranote 13. See alsoAndrew
F. Sunter, TWAIL as NaturalizedEpistemologicalInquiry, 20 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS., 475, 476
(2007) ("[T]here is almost no recognition of [the intellectual contribution of] TWAIL in
mainstream [international law] scholarship").
See infra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
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continuing racial discrimination as well as the continuing effects of this
discrimination." CRT and TWAIL play a corrective role in both respects.
Before discussing how TWAIL and CRT can learn from each other in Part II
and Part III, I want to begin by observing some commonalities among them. Race
is one of the core elements of TWAIL's agenda, especially in tracing the legacies of
colonialism and imperialism in international law. For readers interested in a more
detailed discussion of TWAIL's engagement with race, Part III of this Article
provides that. This Part ofthe Article briefly highlights only some ofthe work done
in TWAIL and CRT with a view to emphasizing their convergences.
Antony Anghie's important 2004 book, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the
Making of InternationalLaw, foregrounds uncovering the juristic techniques of
imperialism in international law. 18 In particular, Anghie showed how Francisco
de Vitoria, the Spanish theologian of the sixteenth century, accounted for
differences between Indians and the Spanish in cultural terms and how the
resulting dynamic of difference between Europeans and non-Europeans
produced the sovereignty doctrine. 19 By contrast to TWAIL, CRT prioritizes
uncovering colorblindness in how law is racially constituted and how mainstream
and even critical scholars avoid analyzing the racial power of law.20 In tracing the
imperial roots of international law, TWAIL scholars like Anghie are not oblivious
to the racist underpinnings of the origins of imperial international law.21 Thus,
after discussing the various techniques positivist jurists from Europe deployed to
account for non-European peoples in the nineteenth century, Anghie concludes
that it is not sufficient "to claim that the racism of the nineteenth century has been
transcended by the achievement of sovereign statehood by the non-European
world." 2 2 From this TWAIL perspective, the dynamic of difference deployed by

17.
18.

19.
20.

21.
22.

Anna Spain Bradley, Human Rights Racism, 32 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 53 (2019) (arguing that
race "remains a neglected topic within international legal scholarship").
Anghie, supra note 5, at 313-14 ("[T]he techniques and methods of imperialism are never
consecutive, as it were: that is, all the techniques and methods of imperialism continue to coexist in the present and, in given circumstances, may easily be resurrected.").
Id. at 13-31.
Kimberla Williams Crenshaw, Unmasking Colorblindness in the Law: Lessons From the
Formation of Critical Race Theory, in SEEING RACE AGAIN: COUNTERING COLORBLINDNESS
ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES 52, 52 (Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Luke Charles Harris, Daniel
Martinez HoSang & George Lipsitz eds., 2019) ("[T]he history of... Critical Race Theory
(CRT) emerged as an intellectual response to colorblindness in the context of institutional
struggles over the scope of equality and the content of legal education."). For a full account, see
generally Crenshaw, supra note 1.
See Gathii, supranote 13 and the discussion in Part III infra.
Anghie,supra note 5, at 109.
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international lawyers ofthe nineteenth century and before were racist.23 Thus, for
TWAIL scholars, race is on the agenda as it is for CRT scholars. Perhaps the
difference might be that that while CRT scholars emphasize race as a central
analytical category, for TWAIL scholars, the construction of colonialism and
imperialism and their enduring legacies are their central analytical points of
departure. In TWAIL, therefore, race takes a variety of forms including culture
and society. In other words, TWAIL scholars trace the different forms that
racialization takes in international law.24
For TWAIL scholars, the enduring distinctions made between Europeans
and non-Europeans or White and non-White people is what created the racial
distinctions from which the development of international law drew.25 After all, it
was this racial logic that associated Whiteness or being European with the
attributes of civilization and modernity such as Christianity, settled agriculture,
and ownership of land. Since non-Europeans lacked these attributes, this racial
logic justified the dispossession of their lands and their colonization. From a
TWAIL perspective, Europe established a "geopolitical order in which it had
already defined or was defining itself as modern and the centre [sic] of history."2
In short, TWAIL's agenda in tracing the colonial imprint and legacy of
international law and CRT's agenda of uncovering supremacy overlap quite
substantially. While White supremacy is a social order created to protect White
privilege for CRT, for TWAIL scholars, international law is a social, political, and
economic order constituted to protect the interests of formerly colonial powers
and the business interests of their elites.2
As I elaborate with specific examples below, CRT provides a toolkit that can
be leveraged to more directly and sharply analyze racialization in the colonial and
imperial continuities and discontinuities on which TWAIL focuses. 28 Such an

23.
24.
25.

Id. at 7 ("[P]ractices of racial discrimination, economic exploitation, territorial dispossession
and cultural subordination were all central to the imperial project .... ").
Thus, Anghie has a whole section subtitled "Colonialism and the racialization of sovereignty."
Id. at 100.
Id. at 103 ("[U]nderstanding ... the role of race and culture in the formation of basic
international law doctrines such as sovereignty is crucial to an understanding of the singular
relationship between sovereignty and the non-European world.").

26.

CHARLES NGWENA, WHAT IS AFRICANNESS? CONTESTING NATIVISM IN RACE, CULTURE AND
SEXUALITIES 59 (2018).

27.

See, e.g., B. S. Chimni, InternationalInstitutions Today: An Imperial GlobalState in the Making,
15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (2004) (arguing that which "exercises the greatest influence in Its
[international institutions] today . .. is that of the transnational fractions of the national
capitalist class in advanced capitalist countries with the now ascendant transnational fractions
in the Third World playing the role of junior partners").
See Makau Mutua, Critical Race Theory and International Law: The View of an InsiderOutsider, 45 VILL. L. REv. 841, 843 (2000) (articulating the same and arguing that CRT has

28.
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analysis would not only enrich TWAIL's agenda of uncovering how international
law obscures its colonial and racist history, but it would also aid TWAIL in
exploring the ongoing legacies of racial oppression and disparity embedded within
its rules and doctrines today. The productivity of adding tools from CRT to allow
TWAIL to more sharply focus on race can be gleaned from the following
example. One CRT scholar has argued that ending legal segregation, as one wing
of American civil rights progressivism campaigned for in much of the twentieth
century, decontextualized racist outcomes from the "larger political, economic,
spatial, and sociological contexts in which schools and students were
situated .... [and in so doing] removed educational inequality from the history of
systematic, institutionalized, often state-sanctioned or state-initiated patterns of
discrimination in housing markets, real estate lending, zoning, and
employment." 29 It is precisely this type of contextualization that takes into
account how inequalities are historically and racially produced in ways that are
also gendered and have class outcomes that would profitably result from
leveraging both CRT and TWAIL in our projects.
CRT and TWAIL are concerned about different racial regimes. For CRT,
the focus is racist or Jim Crow laws. For TWAIL, the focus is colonialism. All
these racial regimes marginalize, discriminate against, and subjugate a variety of
non-White and non-European people. CRT rejects the linear narrative of racial
progress that civil rights overcame Jim Crow. Instead, CRT emphasizes the
reform/retrenchment dynamic-that is, that racial reform and racial
retrenchment are key dialectics of American politics.3 0 Similarly, TWAIL rejects
the idea that colonial rule overcame imperialism and colonialism.31
CRT and TWAIL explicitly reject race neutral accounts of legal liberalism in
domestic and international law, and instead show how race is constituted by law,

29.

30.

31.

"developed a theoretical methodology that is useful in studying the struggles of other
subordinated groups").
Leah N. Gordon, Causality, Context, and Colorblindness: Equal Educational Opportunity and
the Politicsof RacistDisavowal, in SEEING RACE AGAIN: COUNTERING COLORBLINDNESS ACROSS
THE DISCIPLINEs 224,229 (Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Luke Charles Harris, Daniel Martinez
HoSang & George Lipsitz eds., 2019).
Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1361 (critiquing scholars who failed to acknowledge that the
retrenchment or reversal of affirmative action was not simply class structure preservation or
merely the outcome of hegemonic domination, but rather is "connected to racism, that is,
white supremacy and racial stratification").
James Thuo Gathii, TWAIL: A Brief History of Its Origins, Its DecentralizedNetwork, and a
Tentative Bibliography, 3 TRADE L. & DEV. J. 26, 39 (2011) ("TWAIL-ers ... do not regard
international law as having been cleansed of its imperial legacy by post-World War II
guarantees of self-determination and sovereign equality for non-European countries and
peoples, however, they also do not regard international law as simply an apology masking the
raw power and philosophical commitments of its western progenitors.").
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social relations, and the ideology of a dominant race. They show how law
constructs degenerate races as well as Whiteness. In this respect, CRT and TWAIL
therefore share a common and abiding disbelief in the neutrality of law. For both,
law is central to constructing, justifying, and enforcing slavery, colonialism,
and apartheid.32 CRT traces the historical accumulation of racial advantages
and shows how they shape and structure life chances of privileged Whites
today.33 TWAIL traces how imperialism preserved the economic hegemony of
European and American powers as well as how contemporary understandings
of economic development reproduce the tropes of alien, colonial, and racist
rule in the era of neoliberalism.3 4 For CRT, de jure legal progress in abolishing
racist laws does not automatically lead to the de facto racial progress in
abolishing racism.35 From a CRT perspective, the presence of people of color

32.

33.

34.

35.

Antony Anghie and B.S. Chimni argue that "methodologies that purport to be 'universal' and
that rely on concepts posited as having the same valence everywhere ... often prove to be
narrow and particular, a mechanism for advancing certain unacknowledged but specific
interests as being for the universal good." Antony Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Third World
Approaches to InternationalLaw and IndividualResponsibility in Internal Conflict, in THE
METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 185, 210 (Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter eds.,
2004). See also Woods, supra note 14, at 390 ("[C]ritical race and Third World theorists must
question, challenge, and reject fundamental tenets of the canon, such as legal scholarship's
claim to ideological neutrality, aspirations of abstract universality, and the fiction of state
consent that informs legal positivism. They dispute supposedly neutral social values that may
reflect only dominant Northern views. Together with feminists, they interrogate the moral
assumptions that underlie international structures and question the pre-ordained model of
humanity that shapes prevailing concepts of human dignity. They share an emphasis on social
and historical context.") (footnotes omitted).
See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1707, 1780 (1993)
("[E]xposing the critical core of whiteness as property as the unconstrained right to exclude
directs attention toward questions of redistribution and property that are crucial under both
race and class analysis. The conceptions of rights, race, property, and affirmative action as
currently understood are unsatisfactory and insufficient to facilitate the self-realization of
oppressed people.").
James Thuo Gathii, Representations of Africa in Good Governance Discourse: Policing and
ContainingDissidence to Neo-Liberalism, 1998 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 65, 67-68 (19981999) ("[G]ood governance agenda presents its technical and economic jargon as an
ideologically neutral and universal antidote to the 'turmoil', 'chaos', corruption,
authoritarianism and 'disorder' of the post-colonial African experience. The invocation of
such imagery has become key to legitimizing this neo-liberalism as the best, or perhaps the only
alternative to sub-Saharan Africa's predicament.").
Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1368 (arguing that "[a]rticulating their formal demands through
legal rights ideology, civil rights protestors exposed a series of contradictions-the most
important being the promised privileges of American citizenship and the practice of absolute
racial subordination. Rather than using the contradictions to suggest that American
citizenship was itself illegitimate or false, civil rights protestors proceeded as if American
citizenship were real, and demanded to exercise the 'rights' that citizenship entailed. By
seeking to restructure reality to reflect American mythology, Blacks relied upon and
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in influential positions, such as the election of Barack Obama as President of
the United States, is not evidence of the eradication of racial inequalities. 36 The
majority White population in the United States blames Black people and
people of color for the continuing reality of racial inequality.37 Similarly,
international law, and its projects such as neoliberalism, blames non-European
nations for their inequality.38 CRT and TWAIL uncover this.
Having noted the similarities between CRT and TWAIL, it is important
to note they both have different techniques, methods, and approaches. As I
will explore in Part II below, some of the analytic tools of CRT-including
antisubordination,
intersectionality,
multidimensionality,
and
antiessentialism-can and have provided insights that can expand the scope of
TWAIL scholarship.
II.

WHAT CRT's ANALYTICAL TOOLS CAN BRING TO TWAIL

This Part of the Article explores what CRT can bring to TWAIL. I want to
begin by noting that TWAIL does not engage in race minimizing narratives or fail
to consider race as already alluded to above. However, TWAIL exists in the
context of mainstream approaches to international law that ignore or
minimize how to account for race and identity.39 Those dominant approaches fail
to consider the fundamentally racialized nature of the modern world.4 0 They

36.

ultimately benefited from politically inspired efforts to resolve the contradictions by granting
formal rights.").
Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, How ColorblindnessFlourishedin the Age of Obama, in SEEING
RACE AGAIN: COUNTERING COLORBLINDNESS ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES 128, 129 (Kimberl6

37.

38.
39.

40.

Williams Crenshaw, Luke Charles Harris, Daniel Martinez HoSang & George Lipsitz eds.,
2019) (arguing that while "the celebratory dimension of the 'Obama phenomenon' pulled
counties people into its orbit, the colorblind rhetoric of racial denial stripped ongoing efforts
to name and contest racial power of both legitimacy and audience").
WILLIAM RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTIM xii (rev. updated ed. 1976) ("[T]he specific ideology of
Blaming the Victim [was being used] as a major weapon to slow down progress toward
equality.").
Gathii, supra note 34, at 67-68.
Bradley, supranote 17, at 53 (arguing that race "remains a neglected topic within international
legal scholarship"). See also, Gathii, James Thuo, Studying Race in International Law
Scholarship Using a Social Science Approach (February 26, 2021). Chicago Journal of
International Law, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2021, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3793974
(arguing that the American Journal of International Law, the premier international law journal
in the United States has neglected publishing scholarship examining race in international law).
Duncan Bell, Introduction:Empire, Race and Global Justice, in EMPIRE, RACE AND GLOBAL
JUSTICE 10 (Duncan Bell ed., 2019) (quoting Charles Mills as saying that racial ideologies
"'circulate globally, assumptions of nonwhite inferiority and the legitimacy of white rule are
taken for granted, a shared colonial history of pacts, treaties, international jurisprudence, and
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implicitly or explicitly deny, disregard, and depoliticize race analogous to the
mainstream approaches in domestic law that do the same.41 Therefore, the
systematic failure to appreciate how race has shaped modern law is a challenge in
both U.S. domestic law as it is for international law. That said, CRT foregrounds
race as an analytical category, while colonial continuities and discontinuities are
a major analytical focus for TWAIL.
This Part proceeds as follows. First, it examines how CRT discusses race
differently from TWAIL. It then proceeds to explore potential applications of
CRT analytical tools in a TWAIL/global context. The analytical tools examined
include antisubordination, intersectionality, multidimensionality, and
essentialism/anti-essentialism, which CRT scholars use to overcome
mainstream single category identity analysis. In so doing, CRT is able to take into
account the multiple ways in which "powerlessness, marginalization, debilitating
and degrading social hierarchies and exclusion" are created.42 The examination of
these analytical tools is by no means intended to be an exhaustive discussion or
elaboration. In addition, I do not suggest that there is consensus in the vast CRT
literature about the precise contours of these analytical tools. There is a vast
literature that intensely debates and contests these analytical tools within CRT and
related literature that readers can refer to.43 My goal is to point to the potential for
more systematically exploring how the respective theorizations in TWAIL and
CRT could enrich and deepen their respective insights and hopefully inspire more
full-fledged elaborations and explorations.
A.

How CRT Discusses Race Differently From TWAIL

CRT more readily critiques how the "race neutrality of the legal system
creates the illusion that racism is no longer the primary factor responsible for the

41.

42.
43.

a racial-religious conception of being the bearers and preservers of civilization provide
common norms and reference points"').
Ida Danewid, Race, Capital, and the Politics of Solidarity: Radical Internationalism in the 21st
Century, 43-44 (Aug. 2018) (Ph.D. dissertation, London School of Economics)
(http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3848/1/Danewidrace-capital-and-the-politics.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3CXM-ZVKC]) (noting that as "anti-colonial scholars and practitioners such as Cesaire,
Cabral, and Fanon remind us, willful amnesia sits at the heart of the colonial project-because
it sanctions the idea, not only that the world ispostcolonial andpostracial, but also that the long
history of colonialism, racialized indentured servitude, Indigenous genocide, and transatlantic
slavery have left no traces in culture, language, and knowledge production").
Mutua, supra note 28, at 848.
See, e.g., CRITICAL RACE THEORY: KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (KimberlE
Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller & Kendall Thomas eds., 1995);CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS
AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francosco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp & Angela P.
Harris eds., 2002); KHIARA M. BRIDGES, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: A PRIMER (2019).
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condition of the Black underclass."" For CRT, the way in which "white race
consciousness perpetuates norms that legitimate Black subordination" is an
important reference point for understanding the limits of rules of formal equality
and equal opportunity to understand the structural nature of racial exclusion.45
CRT challenges the manner in which formal equality under U.S. law obscures
Black disempowerment and fails to remedy slavery and its continuing legacy. 46
Similarly, TWAIL challenges how the formal equality of States obscures colonial
and postcolonial plunder of resources and the ways that international law
perpetuates the subordination of formerly colonial countries. Since race has not
been the central analytic category for TWAIL in the manner in which it has been
for CRT, there is room for learning, sharing, and collaboration.47 In addition,
CRT's critique of colorblindness in law and other disciplines in the United States
is a powerful lens that could enrich TWAIL scholarship to more sharply focus on
race. CRT critiques American law for making race and racial domination
invisible. 48 CRT scholarship exposes how American law pretends to have
transcended racism while at the same time systematically channels
opportunities and resources along racial lines that benefit Whites at the expense
of Black people. 49 In so doing, American law naturalizes and protects White
preferences and privileges as an inevitable order.5 Rather than demonstrating the

44.
45.
46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1383.
Id. at 1384.
Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 369 (1992) (arguing a commitment to
formal equality perpetuates Black disempowerment and that it provides cover for racist
choices by judges).
Darryl Li calls for unpacking the baggage of postcolonial theory that has informed much of
the work in international law, such as the dichotomy between sovereign/nonsovereign and
colonizer/colonized. DARRYL Li, THE UNIVERSAL ENEMY: JIHAD, EMPIRE, AND THE CHALLENGE
OF SOLIDARITY 13 (for example, noting that "there is no single 'Islamic universalism' or
'Western universalism' as such, but rathermultiple universalist projects whose primaryidioms
may describe themselves as broadly Islamic or Western and which strive for the ability to
invoke such categories with a force that is convincing") (2020).
In this respect, CRT shares much in common with approaches that explore how racial
"domination survives by covering its tracks, by erasing its own history[,]" and in doing such,
these approaches "encourage[] us to think of the mystic boundaries separating, say, West from
East, White from Black, Black from Asian, or Asian from Hispanic, as timeless separations, as
divisions that have always been and will always be." Matthew Desmond & Mustafa Emirbayer,
What Is Racial Domination?, 6 Du BoIs REV. 335, 338 (2009).
Eg., Harris, supra note 33, at 1767 ("[The] Supreme Court's rejection of affirmative action
programs on the grounds that race-conscious remedial measures are unconstitutional under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-the very constitutional measure
designed to guarantee equality for Blacks-is based on the Court's chronic refusal to
dismantle the institutional protection of benefits for whites that have been based on white
supremacy and maintained at the expense of Blacks.").
Id. at 1775 (1993) ("Treating whiteness as the basis for a valid claim to special constitutional
protection is a further legitimation of whiteness as identity, status, and property. Treating
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centrality of race in shaping opportunities and life chances, American law
designates racism as a personal predilection." However, as Cheryl Harris has
shown:
[the] legal legacy of slavery and of the seizure of land from Native
American peoples is not merely a regime of property law that is
(mis)informed by racist and ethnocentric themes. Rather, the law has
established and protected an actual property interest in whiteness itself,
which shares the critical characteristics of property and accords with the
many and varied theoretical descriptions of property. 2

In the United States, therefore, Cheryl Harris and other CRT scholars have
demonstrated how Whiteness was legally produced, protected, and
institutionalized by the social, material, and other advantages and privileges that
were at the same time denied to Black people."
For example, housing segregation along racial lines in major cities in the
United States is not a natural or necessary state of affairs. Rather, it is both a
vestige of slavery and the direct result of policies-including officially sanctioned
private violence-and laws at the federal and state level that constructed,
justified, and enforced segregation in ways that benefited Whites and segregated
Blacks to the least desirable housing and neighborhoods.54 The next Subpart
explores how CRT scholars explore these vestiges of slavery and their continuities
through the lens of racial subordination.
1.

Racial Subordination

Before proceeding to examine some of the ways in which CRT's analytical
tools could be useful in a TWAIL context, I do not mean to suggest the general
applicability of CRT outside the United States. Consider colorblindness, a CRT
analytical tool that seeks to uncover racial subordination, to illustrate the limits
and potential of using CRT analytical tools beyond the United States." By

51.

52.
53.

white identity as no different from any other group identity when, at its core, whiteness is based
on racial subordination ratifies existing white privilege by making it the referential base line.").
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, CriticalRace Histories:In and Out, 53 AM. U. L. REv. 1187, 1214
(2004) ("CRT's understanding of racism [is] as a product of institutional, ideological, and
cultural sources, rather than atomistic acts by 'bad' individuals.").
Harris, supra note 33, at 1724.
Id. at 1741-42. See also RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF
HOw OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA, vii-ix (2017).

54.
55.

ROTHSTEIN, supra note 53, at vii-ix.
According to Michael Omi and Howard Winant, "[r]ace is both a social/historical structure
and a set of accumulated signifiers that suffuse individual and collective identities, inform
social practices, shape institutions and communities, demarcate social boundaries, organize
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racial subordination, CRT scholars refer to at least two types of legally
sanctioned forms of domination of Blacks by Whites: first, symbolic domination
under which Blacks are denied social and political equality notwithstanding
their accomplishments, and second, material subordination under which
"discrimination and exclusion economically subordinated Blacks to whites and
subordinated the life chances of Blacks on almost every level." 5 6 My point is that,
although colorblindness "is regulated through specific national logics of race,"
colorblindness nevertheless "shares fundamental similarities that transcend
borders," and that can therefore travel "across time, national contexts and
genres" particularly in the manner that it makes racial subordination invisible."
Thus, "what appear[s] to be vastly different racial regimes and sociopolitical
contexts produce strikingly similar dominant racial strategies and ideologies."" In
short, racism is not fixed, "immutable, and constant across time and space;"59
rather, it fluctuates. It "assumes different forms in different historical moments."60
One example of a productive application of theorizing racial subordination
outside the United States using a CRT lens is Tendayi Achiume's article analyzing
the 2008 Campbell decision of the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) Tribunal.61 In that decision, the SADC Tribunal, an international court
in Southern Africa, found that a provision of the Constitution of Zimbabwe that
allowed the government to take land from White farmers was racially
discriminatory against them and therefore impermissible under international
law.6 2 Specifically, the Tribunal found the government of Zimbabwe had engaged

the distribution of resources," MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE

56.
57.

UNITED STATES 125 (3rd ed. 2015). In Nicholas De Genova's apt formulation, "race is not a
fact of nature; it is a sociopolitical fact of domination." Nicholas De Genova, The 'Migrant
Crisis"asRacial Crisis: Do Black Lives Matter in Europe?,41 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 1765,1770
(2018). Importantly, race thus conceived is not reducible to skin color (which is a marker of
racism), but instead describes a relation of subordination drawn along the line of the human. Id.
Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1377.
Marzia Milazzo, On the Transportability, Malleability, and Longevity of Colorblindness:
Reproducing White Supremacy in Brazil and South Africa, in SEEING RACE AGAIN:
COUNTERING COLOBLINDNESS ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES 5, 122 (Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw,

58.
59.
60.
61.

62.

Luke Charles Harris, Daniel Martinez HoSang & George Lipsitz eds., 2019) (arguing that
although colorblindness "is regulated through specific national logics of race ... [it] shares
fundamental similarities that transcend borders").
Id. at 122.
Desmond & Emirbayer, supranote 48, at 344.
Id.
E. Tendayi Achiume, The SADC Tribunal: Sociopolitical Dissonance and the Authority of
International Courts, in INTERNATIONAL COURT AUTHORITY 124 (Karen J. Alter, Laurence R.
Helfer & Mikael Rask Madsen eds., 2018).
Campbell v. Republic of Zim 2008 (2) SADCT 4 at 54 (S. Afr.) http://www.saflii.org/
sa/cases/SADCT/2008/2.html [https://perma.cc/9EYC-D45L].
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in unfair racial discrimination against the White farmers inconsistent with Article
6(2) of the SADC Treaty, which outlaws discrimination based on race.63 The
Tribunal's analysis also referred to the International Covenant on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) in elaborating what constitutes
discrimination on the basis of race. 64 Achiume argues that, while the Tribunal's
decision was a plausible reading of the ICERD, the decision failed to take into
account other plausible interpretations of the ICERD 65 that were more resonant
with the history of racial subordination in which a minority ofwhite Zimbabweans
owned and controlled "almost all of the country's prime arable land." 66 In
addition, as Achiume notes, these farmers had acquired that land under "now
universally condemned colonial law." 67
Here, Achiume is referring to the manner in which the racist subjugation of
the peoples of Zimbabwe involved the seizure of their land.68 Achiume is critical
of the Tribunal's invalidation of Zimbabwe's land reforms to give Black
Zimbabweans some of the White-owned land based on an analysis that argued
the de facto differentiation, or the mere racial classification, between Whites and
Blacks constituted unlawful racial discrimination. 69 Achiume argues that the

63.
64.
65.

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 46-47.
For example, Article 1(4) of the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD) provides that:
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement
of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may
be necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or
exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial
discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do not, as a
consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial
groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives for which they
were taken have been achieved.
Achiume, supra note 61, at 143-44 & n.112. See also Gay J. McDougall, Towarda Meaningful
InternationalRegime: The Domestic Relevance of Efforts to Eliminate All Forms of Racial
Discrimination,40 How. L.J. 571 (1997) (arguing that the nonself-executing doctrine denies
U.S. citizens access to remedies under ICERD). In its 2014 report on the United States, the
CERD Committee was very critical of the United States for its restrictions on the use of special
measures (affirmative action)." See G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 17 (Jan. 4, 1969),
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionainterest/pages/cerd.aspx.
[https://perma.cc/72GFTE2E].
Achiume, supranote 61, at 127.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 127 (arguing that "British colonial rule in Zimbabwe entrenched a deeply unequal,
racialized land ownership structure").
Id. at 140 ("[T]he decision can be read as declaring unlawful land reform laws that in effect
disparately impact white farmers, even when land ownership is concentrated among whites
whose title originates in now universally condemned colonial law.").
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ICERD could also have been read to allow such racial differentiation since it has a
clause that arguably permits undoing historical racial subordination.70 In other
words, Achiume is arguing that the mere fact of racial classification cannot by
itselfbe sufficient to constitute a violation ofthe rights ofWhite farmers. By basing
its decision on an anticlassification rationale that favored the White farmers,
rather than an antisubordination rationale that would have upheld redistribution
of land to Black farmers, the Tribunal foreclosed a race-conscious remedy."
Achiume is therefore critical of the Tribunal's failure to consider the possibility
that a race conscious remedy was "necessary to achieve substantive equality for
groups historically subordinated on account of their race.""
The importance of Achiume's argument lies in the fact that the
overwhelming analysis of that important SADC Tribunal decision assumes that
the unfair discrimination argument in favor of the rights of the White farmers had
been decided correctly. Borrowing from CRT's critique of the U.S. Supreme
Court's anticlassification interpretation of equal protection made it possible for
Achiume to see beyond the SADC Tribunal's analysis and clarify how the
Campbell decision cut against the widespread support for land redistribution in
Southern Africa. Achiume instead argues that the fact that the Mugabe
government targeted the SADC Tribunal with a view to terminating its existence
is much better understood as arising from the fact that the Campbelldecision was
politically dissonant with the broad support for land reform in the Southern
African region.73 In other words, the fact that the Tribunal did not attract
broad political support when the government of Zimbabwe targeted it for
termination was a reflection that civil societygroups, political parties, and otherswho would have otherwise sought to save the Tribunal from Mugabe's
machinations to bring its existence to an end-did not support the outcome in the
Campbelldecision. Hence, rather than offering a standard account ofhowthe legal
analysis of the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdictional remit, Achiume places the
decision in the context of the highly unequal and racialized history of land
ownership in Southern Africa and makes the case that the outcome of the case
would have been different from an antisubordination perspective." While she

70.
71.

72.
73.
74.

Id. at 143 ("Article 1(4) of ICERD permits race-based remedies to redress racial
subordination .... ").
Id. ("[T]he very treaty the Tribunal relied upon for its racial discrimination finding-permits
race-conscious remedies where these are necessary to achieve substantive equality for groups
historically subordinated on account of their race.").
Id.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 146 ("[U]nderstanding the relationship between context and the Mugabe regime's
successful contraction of the SADC Tribunal's authority requires moving beyond audience
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does not support the violent and abrupt nature of the Zimbabwean land reform
program, she nevertheless argues that the Campbell decision defied the historical,
social, and political context of unequal land ownership between Blacks and
Whites.75 In so doing, she was able to bring attention to the centrality of race in the
analysis of the Campbell case and the broader context within which it arose like no
other scholars had been able to do. 76
2.

Intersectionality

Another CRT lens that can be productive for TWAIL is intersectionality."
When considering intersectionality, CRT scholars examine "how regimes of
sameness and difference have circumscribed the space Black women have had to
assert themselves as both particularized and generalizable subjects of
discrimination" under U.S. antidiscrimination law.78
Under this understanding, Black women were too different to represent a
class of plaintiffs that included White women or Black men in antidiscrimination
cases. 79 Kimberl6 Crenshaw referred to this as the difference dimension of
intersectionality. 80 On the sameness prong of intersectionality, Crenshaw argued
that case law under U.S. federal law showed that where there were allegations of
racism in employment cases, the courts assumed that Black women were subject
to that racism in the same way that Black men were.8 1 The courts also assumed,

75.
76.

77.

practices, also to consider norms, beliefs, and motivations of key audiences. The sociopolitical
dissonance of Campbell in the context of unresolved postcolonial land reform and racial
inequality in southern Africa is a fundamental piece of the SADC backlash puzzle.").
Id. at 125.
Id. at 140-41 (arguing that the SADC Tribunal "poorly adjudicated the issue of race-conscious
remedies in postcolonial land reform. By invalidating Amendment 17 in the manner it did,
the decision can be read as declaring unlawful land reform laws that in effect disparately impact
white farmers, even when land ownership is concentrated among whites whose title originates
in universally condemned colonial law. This is not an outcome stipulated by international law.
A less dissonant decision would have been narrower, focusing on the Mugabe regime's
violations in the implementation of Amendment 17, without ruling that this provision itself
constituted unlawful racial discrimination.").
For an overview of intersectionality, see Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, Close Encounters of Three
Kinds: On TeachingDominanceFeminism and Intersectionality,46 TULSA L. REv. 151, 155-57
(2010); Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black

Feminist CritiqueofAntidiscriminationDoctrine, FeministTheory andAntiracistPolitics, 1989
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139,140 (1989); Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mappingthe Margins:Intersectionality,
78.
79.
80.
81.

Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color,43 STAN. L. REv. 1241,1242-44 (1991).
Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Intersectionalityat 30: Mappingthe Margins of AntiEssentialism,Intersectionality,and Dominance Theory, 132 HARV. L. REv. 2193, 2222 (2019).
Id. at2221.
Id.
Id.
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illustrating another aspect of the sameness dimension, that if White women were
subject to sexism in the work place, then Black women were impacted by it in
identical ways.8 2 A major takeaway of this CRT intersectionality analysis is that
"Black women's discrimination claims are measured based on their
correspondence or lack of correspondence with the experiences of white women
(as the embodiment of feminism) and Black men (as the embodiment of
antiracism)." 83 Intersectionality therefore exposes how antidiscrimination law
measures Black women's racial discrimination based on a baseline of Black men
and their sex discrimination on the baseline of White women.8 4 Such analysis,
CRT theorists argue, limits the scope of remedies available to Black women in race
and sex discrimination cases since "some courts frame those claims as efforts to
seek 'preferential treatment' in the sense that Black women seek protection on
multiple grounds." 5 By contrast, when White men bring antidiscrimination
cases, even when they have intersectionality built into them-both race and sexcourts are unlikely to argue they are seeking preferential treatment as they do when
Black women bring such claims. 86
Intersectionality as a CRT framework has been criticized for focusing on
Black women, race, and gender and for not being able to capture the dynamic and
contingent processes of identity formation.8 7 In this respect, TWAIL scholarship
overlaps very well with CRT responses to these critiques. There may be ways in
which CRT could further reinforce its intersectionality analysis by combining
forces with TWAIL and TWAIL-inspired feminist analysis. With respect to the
criticism that intersectionality focuses too much on Black women, race, and
gender, TWAIL feminist scholarship proceeds from the view that overlapping and
interdependent forms of gender subordination and discrimination are a central
point of inquiry. 88 In addition, in response to U.S.-style White feminism and its

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

88.

Id.
Id. at 2223.
Id. ("In this respect, Black men and white women (like the 'man' in MacKinnon's analysis)
operate as baselines.").
Id. at 2224.
See id.
See Devon W. Carbado, Colorblind Intersectionality, in SEEING RACE AGAIN: COUNTERING
COLOBLINDNESS ACROSS THEDISCIPLINES 200,202 (Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Luke Charles
Harris, Daniel Martinez HoSang & George Lipsitz eds., 2019) ("As to the first criticism
concerning the scope of intersectionality, the simple response is that intersectionality does not
necessarily and inherently privilege any social category.... Ironically, the claim that
intersectionality is just about [B]lack women reproduces a version of the representational
problem Crenshaw interrogated.").
See Vasuki Nesiah, Toward a Feminist Internationality: A Critique of U.S. Feminist Legal
Scholarship, 16 H ARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 189,210 (1993) ("American feminist legal academics must
critically examine issues central to feminist theory and practice in an international context.
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claims of universality, early TWAIL feminist scholarship emphasized that the
commonality of women's experiences could not serve as a template for feminism
in the Third World. 89 Critical Race Feminists argue that the identities of women
of color are multiplicative-in the sense that they possess multiple
consciousness-based on their intersectional identities. 90 For these TWAIL
feminists, it is simplistic and inaccurate to sweep women from many parts of the
world under one feminist umbrella.91 Like Critical Race Theorists, Critical Race
Feminists examine women's experiences through race and gender "lenses"
simultaneously. 92
Indeed, TWAIL feminist scholars quite easily draw on the multiple
intersections of oppression that women are subjected to. 93 In questioning White
feminism's universalist claims, TWAIL feminists draw on the multiple
experiences of women of color including Black, queer, transgender, lesbian
women, as well as their anticolonial, anti-imperialist, and anticapitalist stances.94
It is not surprising, therefore, that, in a recent edition of his classic international
law text, Bhupinder Chimni finds common cause between his Marxist TWAIL
approach and feminism. 95 Chimni argues that the first wave of international law
feminism failed to grapple with imperialism and its negative consequences for the

89.
90.

91.

92.
93.
94.

95.

They need to acknowledge and confront the theorizing, the struggles and the lives of 'Third
World' women. To do so, they must situate feminist scholarship and political intervention in
the global framework and examine tensions, and also shared understandings, between 'Third
World' and 'First World' women .... As we work towards gendered understandings of the
regulation of sexuality, class, race, nationality and ethnicity, feminist internationality demands
that, in turn, we examine how gender is itself implicated by these other discourses of power.").
See id. at 200.
See, e.g., Adrien Katherine Wing, Global CriticalRace Feminism Post 9-11: Afghanistan, 10
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 19, 24-25, 29-30 (2002). On multiple consciousness, see Mari J.
Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as JurisprudentialMethod, 11
WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 7 (1989).
See id. at 20 (noting that the author's use of the term "women of color" refers to "groups both
inside and outside the United States," and "[i]n the American context ... include [es] African
Americans, Latinas, Asian, and Native Americans, as well as Arabs, Muslims, and any other
group that is being socially constructed as people of color").
See id. at 24-25.
See Nesiah, supra note 88, at 200.
See J. Oloka-Onyango & Sylvia Tamale, "The PersonallsPolitical,"orWhy Women's Rights Are
Indeed Human Rights: An African Perspectiveon InternationalFeminism, 17 HUM. RTs. Q. 691,
697-98 (1995). For a view challenging TWAIL to take LGBT issues on board, see, for example,
Dianne Otto, The Gastronomicsof TWAIL's FeministFlavourings:Some Lunch-Time Offerings,
9 INT'L CMTY. L. REv. 345, 349 (2007).
See B.S. CHIMNI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY
APPROACHES 360 (2017).
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women ofthe Global South. 96 For Chimni, ifthat generation of feminists had more
systematically engaged with TWAIL scholarship, it would have guarded against
the tendency to universalize the experience of White women in the Global North.97
Thus, Chimni argues in favor of integrating class, gender, race-and indeed other
identity categories-for a critical project in international law. 98 Therefore, this
could be another point of departure for a TWAIL/CRT research agenda: studying
how issues of class and globalization intersect with other forms of subordination
for women in the United States as well as in the Third World.
In addition, TWAIL feminist and TWAIL-inspired LGBT scholarship
dovetails well with CRT's inquiry of colorblind intersectionality and its related
analytic multidimensionality. To explain what colorblind intersectionality is,
Devon Carbado uses the example of how a White navy officer in the United States
became the posterchild for the gay rights campaign, even though it was a Black gay
officer who first publicly challenged the then "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy of the
Clinton Administration. 99 That a Black man could not be the representative gay
man around which gay rights advocacy could be structured speaks to how this
agenda made racial discrimination invisible or colorblind. Carbado argues thatunder this form of colorblind intersectionality-"masculinity is one axis along
which middle-class gay men can shore up, express, and naturalize their
whiteness."' Carbado therefore alerts us to how intersectional identities can be
deployed to enhance privilege and in doing so extends and affirms our
understanding of the complexity and fluidity of identity.
Having briefly defined CRT's analytic of colorblind intersectionality and
shown how TWAIL-affiliated feminist scholars and critical race feminists have
critiqued White feminist and other types of colorblind analysis, in the next
Subpart this Article proceeds to examine how CRT's multidimensionality theory
relates to and may inform TWAIL-inspired LGBT and indigenous peoples'
scholarship.

See id. at 359-60 (arguing that the feminist international scholarship of Hilary Charlesworth
and Christine Chinkin did "not explore the critical relationship between the deep structures of
capitalism and imperialism and international law").
97.
See id. at 360, 369 (arguing that Charlesworth's and Chinkin'sfailure to examine "exploitation
of women in the economic 'South'... founds the privileged position of the imperial
feminist").
98.
See id. at 503 (arguing that the promise of a contextual approach to international law lies in
"formulating an intersectional and composite notion of class as it prevents an arbitrary
privileging of class relations irrespective of the social oppression being addressed. The
contextual view recognizes that there are multiple social bases for women's oppression or racial
oppression and that class oppression is often not its most significant cause.").
99.
Carbado, supra note 87, at 216.
100. Id.at216,219.
96.
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Multidimensionality

One CRT theorist defines multidimensionality as an analytic that focuses on
how subordinating "structures interact, interrelate, and are synergistic and
mutually reinforcing."0 1 Another proponent of multidimensionality theory
argues that he prefers multidimensionality because "it more effectively captures
the inherent complexity and irreversibly multilayered nature of everyone's
identities and of oppression. While the term intersectionality suggests a
separability of identities and oppressions, the scholarship in this area has
forcefully taught us otherwise."" 2
Analogous to the analysis of colorblind intersectionality, in the TWAIL
context Ratna Kapur has exposed how postcolonial sexual subjectivities are
problematically constructed and deployed in human rights advocacy and the
liberal media. 103 In so doing, Kapur showed how racial and cultural assumptions
inform LGBT human rights pursuits. 104 The context for her discussion is how
same-sex marriage is deployed "as evidence ofthe primitiveness or backwardness
of non-Western, developing countries, against the more civilized, evolved
approach ofWestern/liberal democracies." 0 5 She argues that this West/non-West
framing deflects attention from the way in which Christian evangelicals from the
United States have been integrally involved in the construction of an anti-gay
agenda in African countries such as Uganda, Kenya, or Nigeria. 10 6 In this framing,
international LGBT human rights advocacy has associated freedom and liberal
values with the West, while African, Islamic, and non-Western societies and their
leaders have been cast as retrogressive and barbaric, all the time while

101. See Athena D. Mutua, Multidimensionality Is to Masculinities What IntersectionalityIs to
Feminism, 13 NEv. L.J. 341, 348 (2013).
102. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal
Theory and PoliticalDiscourse, 29 CONN. L. REv. 561,641 (1997) (emphasis omitted).
103. See RATNA KAPUR, GENDER, ALTERITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FREEDOM IN A FISHBOWL 63,65-66
(2020).
104. See id.
105. Id. at 63.
106. See id. Kapur notes that "[i]t is not Islamic orthodoxy but rather this type of Christian
evangelicalism that is driving a homophobic agenda easily received within a context where
conservative gender and sexual norms, constituted partly by the legacies of the colonial past,
continue to resonate in the postcolonial present." Id. at 63-64. For example, the economic
sanctions and the withdrawal of foreign aid by countries whose largely White evangelical
Christians are centrally implicated in producing or reinforcing homophobia mean that we
have to more rigorously scrutinize the conservative gender and sexual norms from these
countries. See id. at 64.
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overlooking the ways in which homophobia continues to be a feature of
Western liberal democracies. 10 7
Kapur argues that such LGBT activist interventions outside the West have
reproduced the binaries between those societies that are viewed as progressive and
civilized, on the one hand, and those societies that remain in a state of transition
until the human rights of LGBT persons within them are secured, on the other. 108
According to Kapur, in this problematic framing, "'[q]ueer' serves not as a
signifier of sexual identity or sexual subversion, but merely as a defused
inscription of socio-political difference within a larger modality of hierarchical
regulation and governance."109 This characterization repeats a familiar colonial
trope of the civilized and uncivilized." Moreover, LGBT human rights advocacy
has become entwined with exclusionary and highly aggressive agendas that
threaten freedom and that justify violent militarism." According to Kapur, these
interventions come at the cost of erasing the "subjectivity and choice for those
marked by such interventions as simultaneously in need of rescue and
threatening to the prevailing social norm." 2 She therefore concludes that the
pursuit of an LGBT agenda based on the experiences of the United States and
Europe has "erase[d] or marginalize [d] articulations ofnon-Western perspectives
on sex and sexuality, while also reinforcing the purported civilizational superiority
of Western states." 1 3
Sylvia Tamale's African Sexualities:A Reader addresses "what [it] means to
research the politics ofsexualities and gender in African contexts, both with a sense
ofthe colonial ... gazes which configured African embodiment as simultaneously

107.

108.
109.

Kapurpoints to the protests in Paris in 2013 where vast rallies opposed the move to legalize
same-sex marriage. See id. She also points to the persistence of discriminatory initiatives
against LGBT people in the United States, despite the legalization of same-sex marriage.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 65-66 (illustrating the "exclusionary politics and the recurrent predication of rights
recognition for LGBT subjects against the politics of Empire, racism and militarism"). Kapur
argues that the "new locus of LGBT rights is centrally fixed within a security discourse that
reproduces binaries based on racial and cultural exclusions, and also finds its justification in
the rescue of the sexual subaltern from what is viewed as the primitive, homophobic 'Other."'
Id. at 66.
See id.
Id.

110.
111.
112. Id.
113. Id. This criticism "suggests that the gay rights movement, which produces a particular kind of
tolerable homosexual-the 'gay international'-is nothing more than a neo-colonial
enterprise that annuls the possibility of a valid, authentically postcolonial, non-Western
narrative of queer sexuality, rights claims and identity politics." Id. at 66-67.
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exotic and bestial."" 4 Herbook goes beyond the assertion that the term "minority"
should include LGBT individuals." 5 She asserts:
[F]ar from being marginal victims of patriarchal and postcolonial
systems, African writers and researchers who take gender and
sexualities seriously constitute a critical, dynamic, and fabulously
diverse set of interlocutors whose ideas cataly[z]e not simply a
conversation about rights but a political kaleidoscope of possibilities for
remapping African epistemologies of the body."16

Like CRT scholars of the intersectionality and multidimensionality theories
as we shall see below, Tamale argues that researching human sexuality must be
accompanied by a gendered analysis." 7 She argues that class, age, religion, race,
ethnicity, culture, locality, and disability all influence the sexual lives of men and
women. 18 She urges "[r]esearchers in the field of sexuality [to] remember that the
concepts of sexuality and gender, as normatively used, denote both power and
"[T]o speak of gendered sexualities and/or sexualized
dominance."119
genders . . . . [would] allow[] for in-depth analyses of the intersections of the
ideological and historical systems that underpin each concept, an important factor
in knowledge production.""
Tamale argues that the foregoing characterizations of gendered sexualities in
Africa are not universally embraced." She notes that "[m]any researchers still
view sexuality within the narrow spectrum of the sex act without exploring the
extraneous factors that impact and shape our multifarious sexualities."12 2 She
agrees with scholars of African sexuality that urge a reading of the multiple
sexualities "to disperse the essentialism embedded in so much sexuality
research."" 3 "Reference to sexuality in the plural does not simply point to the

&

114. Jane Bennett, "Worst Woman of the Year": Sylvia Tamale PublishesAfrican Sexualities: A
Reader, AWID (Oct. 10,2011), https://www.awid.org/news-and-analysis/worst-woman-yearsylvia-tamale-publishes-african-sexualities-reader [https://perma.cc/8SXU-WAG2].
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Sylvia Tamale, Researchingand TheorizingSexualities in Africa, in SEXUALITY AND POLITICS:
REGIONAL DIALOGUES FROM THE GLOBAL SOUTH 16 (Sonia Correa, Rafael de la Dehesa
Richard Parker, eds., 2014) ("Sexuality and gender go hand in hand; both are creatures of
culture and society, and both play a central, crucial role in maintaining power relations in our
societies.").
118. Id.
119. Id. at 47.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 17.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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diverse forms of orientation, identity, or status."" It is a move that does not seek
to essentialize, but it "is a political call to conceptualize sexuality outside the
normative social orders and frameworks that view it through binary oppositions
and labels."" These "dimensions of sexuality include sexual knowledge, beliefs,
values, attitudes and behaviors, as well as procreation, sexual orientation, and
personal and interpersonal sexual relations."126
In this respect, the discussion of sexuality in the non-Western context as
advanced by both Kapur and Tamale has similarities with one of the offshoots of
intersectionality theory: multidimensionality theory. Like multidimensionality
theory, Kapur and Tamale are exploring "[t]he idea that intersecting social
systems are mutually reinforcing.""' Citing racial profiling, "higher rates ofhyper
incarceration, death by homicide and certain diseases, suicide rates, and high
unemployment" as contexts in which Black men face harsher treatment as
compared to Black women, Athena Mutua's account of multidimensionality
explores the intersection of race and gender for Black men especially.1 2 8 She
challenges the assumption in intersectionality theory that Black men were
privileged by sex (relative to Black women) but oppressed on account of their
race. 1 2 9 Multidimensionality explicitly embraces the mutually reinforcing
structures of oppression and subordination.13
Multidimensionality, which Darren Hutchinson calls a postintersectionality theory, has potential utility for a current debate within TWAIL.131
Scholars studying indigenous peoples in international law have critiqued
TWAIL scholarship for not having an adequate theory of subordination as
reflected by the failure of TWAIL scholarship to adequately address the concerns
of indigenous peoples. Amar Bhatia, for example, makes the case that there is an
absence of indigenous peoples in TWAIL's retelling of international legal

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Mutua, supra note 101, at 348.
Id. at 346.
Id.
See id.
Athena Mutua notes that even Kimberl6 Crenshaw acknowledged "the
multidimensionality of Black women's experience with the [antidiscrimination] single-axis
analysis that distorts these experiences." Id. at 349 (quoting Crenshaw). According to Mutua,
subordinating "structures interact, interrelate, and are synergistic and mutually reinforcing."
Id. at 348.
131. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: "Intersectionality,""Multidimensionality,"and
the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MIcH. J. RACE & L. 285, 309-11
(2001).
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history. 3 2 He argues that TWAIL's retelling of international legal history
embraces a solidarity of decolonized African and Asian states that subsumes
within it indigenous peoples and their legal traditions and practices.1 3 In this
sense, by examining the multidimensional nature of colonial subordination to
include indigenous peoples, Amar Bhatia offers a corrective to decolonizing
movements and their attendant scholarship that, in his view, embraced
assimilationist goals inconsistent with the interest of indigenous peoples and
thereby erased their distinctive experiences as well as their activism.3 4
Like multidimensionality scholars who examine multiple reinforcing
structures of subordination, TWAIL scholars who examine indigenous peoples
show how African and Asian peoples simultaneously occupy a privileged position
because decolonization granted them political independence while continuing to
be economically subordinated in the global economic system.13 5 By contrast,
indigenous people continue to be subordinated within Africa and Asian nation
states, within Western settler countries like the United States and Canada, and
within the global economic system. 136 In a significant sense, this critique of
TWAIL for underplaying the subordination of indigenous peoples is closely
linked to the importance postcolonial theory places on the postcolonial nation
state and its subjects who successfully seized privileges denied to them under

132. See, e.g., Amar Bhatia, The South of the North: Building on CriticalApproaches to International
Law With Lessons From the FourthWorld, 14 OR. REV. INT'L L. 131 (2012).
133. Id. at 136.
134. Id. at 157-59.
135. See Joel M. Ngugi, The Decolonization-ModernizationInterface and the Plight of Indigenous
Peoples in Post-ColonialDevelopment Discourse in Africa, 20 Wis. I NT'L L.J. 297 (2001).
136. Id. at 315 ("In the Third World, instead of the formerly oppressed groups critically
questioning the legal order that enabled the entrenchment of a diabolic rule as the one just
past, the emerging states became impatient to attain 'statehood' as defined by the former
oppressor. The need to enter the 'family of nations' was suddenly a deeply desired goal. No
more questions were being asked about the paradox of an international legal order that had
acquiesced to, even mandated their earlier subjugation. Indeed, the reverse happened. The
emerging states quickly mastered the rules of the game and garnered the tools of the former
'master.' Alien concepts such as 'sovereignty' were soon in use against further attempts by
those segments of the populations that felt dissatisfied with the emerging order. The same
means used by the departing conqueror in an era just past to stunt self-determination were
now in use by a different conqueror. The indigenous peoples, aspiring for their genuine
existence as before, came against a new conqueror more determined than the foreign
conqueror to give in to their aspirations. The original conqueror has succeeded prodigiously.
A whole history of colonization and subjugation were to be given short shrift. All attempts at
further 'disintegration' were deemed to be a de trop menace to the 'state."') (footnote omitted).
See also Mohammed Shahabuddin, Post-colonialBoundaries, International Law, and the
Making of the Rohingya Crisisin Myanmar, 9 AsIAN J. OF INT'L L. 347 (2019) (arguing that "far
from being a corrective to potential "chaos", the continuation of arbitrarily-drawn colonial
boundaries undermines the legitimate right to self-determination of numerous ethnic
minorities in postcolonial states and often results in violent ethnic conflicts").
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colonial rule and whose goal was to remake the colonial state in the postcolonial
period, rather than undo it. 13" It is in this respect that native lands seized by
colonizing powers and the indigenous peoples who lived on them remained to be
exploited and reoccupied by the postcolonial elites.138
Similarly, CRT scholarship has not generally included indigenous
perspectives. While indigenous peoples have been racialized, their oppression is
not easily reducible to race or labor exploitation. Rather, the racialization of
indigenous peoples was designed to eliminate them with a view to appropriating
their lands and claims to it-through genocide, ethnocide, and for those that
remained, the requirement to be compulsorily assimilated into White America. 139
From this perspective, indigeneity is not simply another form of identity or relic
from the past, but a fundamental critique of the dominant legal and economic
order that excludes and erases indigenous peoples, particularly in settler colonial
States including those in the Americas and in the South Pacific as well as in places
like South Africa.140 Thus, a key indigenous demand is not merely racial equality
in a settler colonial state, but rather self-determination and autonomy.14 1
B.

Essentialism and Anti-Essentialism

The use of the term Third World in TWAIL has been subject to sustained
14
debate.2
The upshot of that debate is that the term is essentialist. Critics of the

137. Id.
138. Eve Tuck & K. Wayne Yang, Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor, 1 DECOLONIZATION:
INDIGENEITY,EDUC. &SOC'Y 1, 19 (2012).
1 39. See generally Carmen Gonzalez, Racial Capitalism, ClimateJustice, and Climate Displacement,
11 ONATI SOCIG-LEGAL SERIES, FORTHCOMING: CLIMATE JUST. ANTHROPOCENE 108,115 (2021),

https://doi.org/10.35295/osls.iisl/0000-0000-0000-1137
[https://perma.cc/S7G7-KSVH]
(arguing in part that "the logic of anti-Native racism was the elimination of the Native in order
to appropriate indigenous lands"); Natsu Taylor Saito, Tales of Colorand Colonialism:Racial
Realism and Settler ColonialTheory, 10 FLA. A&M U. L. REv. 1, 108 (2014).
1 40. I thank my colleague Carmen Gonzalez for our fruitful discussions that helped me clarify this
and other points in this Article. For an analysis of the tension between the status tribes of as
sovereign nations and racialized groups, see Gloria Valencia-Weber, Racial Equality: Old and
New Strains and American Indians, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 333 (2004); Carole Goldberg,
Descent Into Race, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1371 (2002). See also James Thuo Gathii, The Promise of
International Law: A Third World View (Including a TWAIL Bibliography 1996-2019 as an
Appendix) (Twenty-Second Annual Grotius Lecture) 114 Proceedings of the ASIL Annual
Meeting, 165-87. doi:10.1017/amp.2021.87 (arguing that international law scholarship has had
an epistemic silence with regard to the voices of Indigenous scholars of international law).
141.

PEDRO A. MALAVET, AMERICA'S COLONY: THE POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CONFLICT BETWEEN
THE U.S. AND PUERTO RICO (2007).

142. See Gathii, supra note 13. See also Prabhakar Singh, Indian International Law: From a
ColonisedApologist to a SubalternProtagonist,23 LEIDEN J.INT'LL. 79, 97, 102 (2010) (arguing
that "Third World" as "a new currency for identifying the deprived of both the North and the
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use of the term Third World argue that it presupposes that all former colonies are
homogeneous.143 Further, they argue that the term inaccurately naturalizes and
reifies the Third World as a collectivity that in 2021 is inaccurate relative to the
1950s and 1960s. 144 In any event, now as in the 1950s and 1960s, the critics argue,
the Third World does not share any common essence.14 5 On this view, the use of
the term Third World is argued to be an outdated vision that held sway with Third
World leaders in the optimistic decolonization moment of the 1950s and 1960s. 146
In response, TWAIL scholars argue that use of the term Third World is not
intended to connote the true essence of a Third World as a coherent geographical
space that is historically fixed in time.147 As Jean and John Comaroff argue, the
Third World is not a geographical area, but rather an intellectual and
epistemological alliance between those who are categorized as "oppressed" and
marginalized in the intellectual community. 148 Balakrishnan Rajagopal explains
that the conception of the Third World in TWAIL is one that locates its origins
in the hierarchical ordering of states and regions that arose from the
subordination that accompanied colonialism and imperialism.149
Rajagopal's point is very important. It coincides with a CRT insight that
helps respond to essentialist critiques of the use of the term Third World, that is,
to think of the term Third World as an antisubordinating term whose goal is to
disrupt and hopefully dismantle the hierarchies upon which the contemporary
unequal and racist global order is based. In a recent article, Devon Carbado and

143.

144.

145.

146.
147.
148.
149.

South" that transcends the nation state and serves as "a unified category of the famished ofboth
the First and the Third World").
See Dianne Otto, Subalternity and InternationalLaw: The Problems of Global Community and
the Incommensurability of Difference, 5 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 337 (1996) (challenging the
concept of a unanimous non-European identity in world politics).
For a collection of essays pushing back against the use of the term Third World in the period
beyond the decolonization era of the 1950s and 1960s, see generally AFTER THE THIRD WORLD?
(Mark T. Berger, ed., 2009).
See, e.g., Jos6 E. Alvarez, My Summer Vacation (Part III): Revisiting TWAIL in Paris,
OPImoJuRus (Sep.28, 2010), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/28/my-summer-vacation-part-iiirevisiting-twail-in-paris [https://perma.cc/QK9U-E97A] (arguing that TWAIL's field of
application is too broad and restricted to the Third World). See John D. Haskell, TRAIL-ing
TWAIL: Arguments and Blind Spots in Third World Approaches to InternationalLaw, 27
CANADIAN J.L. & JuRms. 383,386 (2014) (arguing that TWAIL-ers are less interested in setting
themselves apart, leading them to be so open to diverse views that they have lost their
meaning).
See Gathii, supranote 13.
See id.
Jean Comaroff & John L. Comaroff, Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-AmericaIs Evolving
TowardAfrica, 22 ANTHROPOLOGICAL F. 113, 115 (2012).
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Locatingthe Third World in CulturalGeography, 15 THIRD WORLD
LEGAL STUD. 1, 8 (1998-1999).
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15
Cheryl Harrisinvoke Diana Fuss"
to argue that it is less important to establish the
reason why a particular term is being used in an essentialist way, and that we
should instead focus on "the ideological motivation for and effects of that
essentialism.""' Drawing inspiration from this insight that Carbado and Harris
make, TWAIL scholars can add another argument in response to the essentialist
critique of the term Third World: that we have to avoid unreflectively dismissing
the use of the term Third World because it would inhibit innovative
antisubordination analysis of the international legal order. Indeed, as Vijay
Prashad has argued, the idea of the Third World galvanized a sociopolitical
movement that "made the identity of the Third World comprehensive and
viable."" In other words, without building a coalition of African, Asian, and
Central and South American countries, the force of anticolonialism would have
been difficult to sustain. As such, the Third World is comprised of a broad coalition
bound less by race than by their common colonial and anticolonial history.153
Algeria, one of the leaders of the Third World in the early 1960s, well
understood the importance of building a united Third World coalition that
could not be split by the cold war powers, including the United States, the
Soviet Union, and China. 154 As a leader of the Third World coalition in this
period, Algeria deemphasized its Arab-Muslim identity and argued instead that
Third World solidarity had to be conceptualized as political rather than in racial
or geographical terms as the Chinese would have wanted.155 As Jeffrey James
Byrne has argued, "Algerians, Yugoslavians, Cubans, and others saw the Third
World as a political project open to anyone who shared its goals." 15 6 Josip Tito of

150.

DIANA FUSS, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NATURE & DIFFERENCE, xi (1989).

151.

Carbado & Harris, supra note 78, at 2205.

152.

VIJAY PRASHAD, THE DARKER NATIONS: A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE THIRD WORLD 13 (2007).

1 53. Id. at 33. This point is related to how the term "strategic essentialism" has been used in some
contexts. On strategic essentialism as originally used by Gaytri Spivak, see Gaytri Spivak,
Subaltern Studies: DeconstructingHistoriography,in THE SPIV AK READER 203 (Donna Landry
& Gerald MacLean, eds.,1996).
154.

JEFFREY JAMES BYRNE, MECCA OF REVOLUTION: ALGERIA, DECOLONIZATION AND THE THIRD

WORLD ORDER 214 (2016).
155. Mao Tse-Tung warned Black Africa "thatwhite, northern, and industrialized peoples like
the Russians and Yugoslavians could never truly share the concerns of the Southern
Hemisphere." Id. at 213. For Mao's argument that we are of the same race, see RADCHENKO
SERGY, TWO SUNS IN THE HEAVENS: THE SINO- SOVIET STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY, 1962-1967 82
(2009). For the argument made by China at the time that "we non-whites must hold together,"
see W. A. C. Adie, China, Russia, and the Third World, 11 CHINA Q. 200,213 (1962).
156. BYRNE, supra note 154, at 214. Byrne notes that "Algerians vaulted continents, the color line,
and the Cold War in their determination to avoid the confinements of identity politics, on the
one hand, and 'great power chauvinism," on the other." Id. In short, Algerians promoted an
international cosmopolitan Third World agenda-while at the same time pursued an
"intolerantnationalism" at home. Id. at 223.
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Yugoslavia, who wanted to keep the Soviets at bay at the time of the Bandung
conference, deemphasized Yugoslavia's European identity and preferred a
political criteria for membership ofthe Third World.157 It was this desire for Third
World solidarity and unity in the struggle against colonialism and racialism that
was a linchpin of the 1955 Third World Bandung Conference. 158
This unity shows even Third World leaders understood the practical
importance of coalitional politics or essentialism-as scholars of identity politics
would characterize it-for a united front in opposing colonialism and
imperialism. It is unsurprising that colonizing powers also understood the
strategic importance of the "'fixity' in the ideological construction of an othered,
conquered people to achieve both the representation of the discovery of an
unchanging order as well as its disorder and degeneracy." 159 Essentialism
therefore is a stratagem that the colonizing and formerly colonized resorted to so
that they could advance their interests.
III.

WHAT TWAIL's ANALYTICAL TOOLS CAN BRING TO CRT

A central TWAIL insight is that rules of international law reproduce racial
structuring of world politics, particularly along the European/non-European
axis. 160 TWAIL scholarship argues that race is a relationship or construct of
domination, and TWAIL scholarship challenges international law to take into
account its role in ratifying and embracing racial slavery and colonial conquest. 161

157. According to Mark Atwood Lawrence, as "the leader of a European nation ... [Tito] rejected
the notion that such a movement should be limited to Asia and Africa, preferring political
rather than geographical or racial criteria for membership. Tito's approach was obviously selfinterested, for he desperately needed allies to bolster his defiance of the Soviet bloc." Mark
Atwood Lawrence, The Rise andFall ofNonalignment,in THE CoD WAR IN THE THIRD WORLD
139, 144 (Robert J. McMahon ed., 2013).
158. PRASHAD, supranote 152 at 49 ("Unity for the people of the Third World came from a political
position against colonialism and imperialism, not from any intrinsic cultural or racial
commonalities. If you fought against colonialism and stood against imperialism, then you
were part of the Third World. Sukarno's views found common currency among most of the
delegates to the Bandung meeting, whether of the Left (China), the center (India and Burma),
or the Right (Turkey and the Philippines)."). This point accords with Ann Laura Stoler, On
PoliticalandPsychologicalEssentialisms,
25 ETHOs 101, 105 (1997), to the effect that essentialist
"thinking may ... ready us to carve social categories at some broad cognitive joints, but it is
historically specific relations of power that ensure that cognitive propensities are realized as
political ones."
159. Ngwena, supra note 26, at 52. See also HoMi K. BHABHA, The Other Question: Stereotype,
Discriminationand the Discourseof Colonialism, in THE LOCATION OF CULTURE 94, 94 (1994).
160. See ANGHIE, supra note 5.
161. Indeed, as Anibal Quijano explains:
[I]fwe observe the main lines of exploitation and social domination on a global
scale, the main lines of world power today, and the distribution of resources and
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For TWAIL, international law is the product of a combination of the colonial
project and anthropologically reified definitions of the primitive.1 6 2 It is this
racialized primitiveness of the non-European that justified conquest and
subjugation. 163 These deeply racialized discourses presumed the West was
superior and civilized but were also predicated on assumptions of White
supremacy, in which White was pure, neutral, and rational while the others were
impure, abnormal, and degenerate. 164

In 2000, Ruth Gordon observed that "CRT may be a valuable means of
deconstructing international legal discourse and revealing racial subordination
where it is now camouflaged or hidden." 165 That year, she also organized a
symposium on CRT and international law that produced an excellent volume of
reflections on how international law could fruitfully engage with CRT to more
fully uncover race. 166 In the keynote address at that 2000 CRT/International Law
Symposium that Ruth Gordon organized, Makau Mutua argued that "CRT
scholars must start to write in an international idiom; they must demonstrate
that they understand that the conditions of subordination in the United States
are part and parcel of the global structure of dehumanization." 167
CRT scholars have also been cognizant of the international legal dimensions
of their project. Thus, the introduction to the CRT's 1995 publication, CRT: The
Key Writings That Formed a Movement, anticipated the utility of CRT beyond the
United States and urged scholars to explore "processes that produce globalized
racial stratification." 168 A subsequent CRT volume devoted an entire part of the

162.
163.
164.
165.

166.
167.
168.

work among the world population, it is very clear that the large majority of
the exploited, the dominated, the discriminated against, are precisely the
members of the 'races', 'ethnies', or 'nations' into which the colonized
populations, were categorized in the formative process of that world power,
from the conquest of America and onward.
Anibal Quijano, ColonialityandModernity/Rationality,21 CULTURAL STUD. 168,168-69 (2007).
See Anghie, supra note 5, at 3-12 and 310-20.
Id.
Id.
Ruth Gordon, CriticalRaceTheory andInternationalLaw:ConvergenceandDivergenceRacing
American Foreign Policy, 94 AM. SOCY INT'L L. PROC. 260, 261 (2000); see also Penelope E.
Andrews, MakingRoom for CriticalRace Theory in InternationalLaw: Some PracticalPointers,
45 ViL. L. REV. 855 (2000) (making the case that CRT could be a useful analytic framework for
international law, particularly international human rights, and engaging in questions of
development and poverty in the Third World).
Ruth Gordon, Critical Race Theory and International Law: Convergence and Divergence, 45
VILL. L. REV. 827,827-29 (2000).
Mutua, supra note 28, at 852.
Introduction, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xxx
(Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller & Kendall Thomas eds., 1995).
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book to Globalization and included a chapter by leading CRT/TWAIL

international scholar Henry J. Richardson

111.169

The purpose of this Part of the Article is to show why it would be productive
for CRT to take into account TWAIL's agenda of tracing subordination along the
color, race, and cultural lines in a global context. This line of inquiry converges
with new imperial and transnational histories such as those of settler colonialism
that make connections between different colonies and in so doing show greater
attention to the entanglements of metropolitan and colonial worlds.1" Expanding
CRT's gaze to embrace transnational histories-as well as the connections and
webs of circulation between locations that have undergirded and reinforced White
supremacism and anticolonial resistance-could yield new analytic insights into
the nature of the United States as a colonial and imperial power.
To do so, CRT could borrow from the way that TWAIL scholars have
analyzed, deconstructed, and critiqued international legal doctrines such as
sovereignty and traced the ways they have shaped imperialism in the
contemporary global order. Take the example of the U.S. possession, Puerto
Rico, that was ceded to the United States following the Spanish American War
in the 1898 Treaty of Paris."' In a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions,
referred to as the Insular Cases, Puerto Rico was declared to be an
unincorporated territory of the United States, but subject to Congress's absolute
authority.1 2 Since Puerto Rican was not deemed to be part ofthe United States, its
inhabitants were declared to be Puerto Rican rather than U.S. citizens.1 3
The Supreme Court's finding that Puerto Rico is "a territory appurtenant and
belonging to the United States"" 4 is a very familiar strategy of colonial empires
explored in TWAIL scholarship. From a TWAIL perspective, the judicial
determinations surrounding Puerto Rico's status in the United States are eerily
familiar in the colonial discourses deployed by other colonial powers in Asia,
Africa, and Australia when their authority was challenged by those under colonial

169.

CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY,

supra note 43,

at 288-302,

303-78.
170.

See RADHIKA MONGIA, INDIAN MIGRATION AND EMPIRE: A COLONIAL GENEALOGY OF THE
MODERN STATE (2018).

171. Treaty of Paris, Spain-U.S., Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754.
172. Efren Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism: The Insular Cases
(1901-1922), 65 REV. JURIDICAU.P.R. 225 (1996).
173. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) ("We are therefore of opinion that the Island of
Porto Rico [sic] is a territory appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but not a part of
the United States within the revenue clauses of the Constitution .... "). For an analysis of these
cases, see Ramos, supra note 172.
174. Downes, 182 U.S. at 287.
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rule.1 5 In each of these contexts, European colonial powers justified retaining or
holding on to non-European territories rather than allowing statehood because
they were populated by "inferior races." In fact, the Supreme Court explicitly
justified retaining control over Puerto Rico on these grounds. 17 6 Scholars have
argued that such justifications were necessary to satisfy White settler populations
while marginalizing and dispossessing local populations such as Mexicans and
Native Americans. 177 This marginalization and expansion indicated the
persistence and extension of slavery.178
This stratagem deployed by the United States under which Puerto Rico was
pulled in opposite directions-increasingly tied to the United States and
insistently defined as not part of it-is a very familiar story in TWAIL scholarship.
There is a near perfect symmetry between the justifications used by U.S. judges
over Puerto Rico with those used by British judges to argue that the barbaric and
racially inferior populations of colonial possessions in Africa and Asia did not
deserve the protection of the rights of birth right citizenship, such as judicial
review. 179 Thus, the very coupling of the status of colonial territories to the racial

175.

Orlando Patterson, Rethinking Black History, 41 HARV. EDUC. REv. 297 (1971) (arguing that
the history of minority communities in international law must be comparative). Similarly,
Henry J. Richardson III's scholarship traces the Black experience not just in the United
States but around the world. See James T. Gathii, Henry . Richardson III: The Fatherof Black
Traditions ofInternationalLaw, 31 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 325 (2017).
176. In Downes, regarding whether Puerto Rico came within the revenue clauses of the U.S.
Constitution, the Supreme Court held that:
[i]f those possessions are inhabited by alien races, differing from us in religion,
customs, laws, methods of taxation and modes of thought, the administration of
government and justice, according to Anglo-Saxon principles, may for a time be
impossible; and the question at once arises whether large concessions ought not
to be made for a time, that, ultimately, our own theories may be carried out, and
the blessings of a free government under the Constitution extended to them. We
decline to hold that there is anything in the Constitution to forbid such action.
Downes, 182 U.S. at 287.
177. CRT scholars argue that "racialization of identity and the racial subordination of Blacks and
Native Americans provided the ideological basis for slavery and conquest." Harris, supra note
33, at 1715.
178.

CESARJ. AYALA &RAFAEL BERNABE, PUERTO RICO IN THE AMERICAN CENTURY: A HISTORY SINCE

1898 (2009).
179. See James Thuo Gathii, Imperialism, Colonialism, and International Law, 54 BUFF. L. REV.
1013, 1057 (2007) (analyzing cases challenging colonial rule from Africa and how they
overlapped with cases from the United States in the early twentieth century). For discussions
on Australia and other British colonies, see, for example, ROBERT J. MILLER, JACINTA RURU,
LARISSA BEHRENDT & TRACEY LINDBERG, DISCOVERING INDIGENOUS LANDS: THE DOCTRINE OF
DISCOVERY IN THE ENGLISH COLONIES (2010).
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status of the individual inhabitants is a shared technique of empire, whether
American or British or beyond. 180
From a TWAIL perspective, Puerto Rico is very much like protectorates
under British colonial rule. Like Puerto Rico, protectorates were tied to the British
empire, but since they were not yet fully annexed as colonies, they were insistently
defined as not part of the British empire.181 Under the theory of British imperial
law, protectorates were considered to be an interlude between formal
annexation-to become fully-fledged British colonies-and the precolonial
status.18 2 As W. E. Hall, a British international lawyer, argued, this ambiguous
status ofprotectorates was a stratagem that allowed the British empire to avoid the
financial burden of its colonial possessions since technically they were not formally
part of the empire. 183
Take the example of a British case on protectorates from early twentieth
century in East Africa that sounds eerily similar to the InsularCases surrounding
the status of Puerto Rico, Ol le Njogo v Attorney-General.184 Here, British judges
found the East African Protectorate to be a foreign country outside the dominion
of the British crown. 185 Yet, at the time, the British had unlimited powers-civil,
criminal, and judicial-over the East African Protectorate. 186 According to British
colonial judges, non-British peoples could not seek relief from a British court
because they did not have "birthright" citizenship. 187 The court argued the Maasai,
who had brought the case to enforce treaty rights with the British, were aliens, not
subjects. To justify this finding, the Colonial judges argued that the:
idea that there maybe an established system oflaw to which a man owes
obedience, and that at any moment he may be deprived of the
protection of the law, is an idea not easily accepted by English lawyers.
It is made less difficult if one remembers that the Protectorate is over a

180. Notably, Cesar Ayala and Rafael Bernabe tie one of the Insular Cases, Balzac v. PuertoRico, 258
U.S. 298 (1922), to eight of the judges who decided Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896),
suggesting the vast scope for a long overdue research agenda between CRT, LatCrit, TWAIL
and other critical types of scholarship. AYALA & BERNABE, supra note 178. See also Go, supra
note 8; Ramos, supra note 172.
181. See Gathii, supra note 179, at 1034 (noting that although the East African Protectorate "was
really a part of the British Empire," British colonial courts held that it was "a foreign country
outside the dominions of the Crown" and that in fact "the Crown or its representatives had

unlimited powers in the protectorate").
182. Id. at 1033.
183. Id.
184. Ol le Njogo v. Att'y Gen. (1913) 5 L.R.K. 70 (Kenya). This case is examined at length in Gathii,
supra note 179.
185. Gathii, supra note 179, at 1046.
186. Id. at 1034.
187. Id. at 1038.
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country in which a few dominant civilised [sic] men have to control a
great multitude of the semi-barbarous. 88

The upshot ofthe comparative analysis between Puerto Rico's status and the
status of British protectorates shows that there are similarities in the ways colonial
empires were organized to prevent colonized peoples from holding colonial
governments accountable. The fact that race was a major justification in
declining to hold White colonial governors responsible for violating the rights of
their non-White subjects-in the Americas, Africa, and beyond-provides
potential that TWAIL analysis might enable CRT to more powerfully uncover the
status of the United States as a colonial power no less than European colonial
powers of another era.
Carrying out a TWAIL agenda on themes that are traditionally within the
remit of CRT could also be very productive in further interrogating how
international law was deployed by Black people under slavery, a project that Henry
Richardson III has inauguratedwith groundbreaking research. 189 The continuities
of the United States' racist policies in U.S. foreign policy have been explored, 190but
combining CRT and TWAIL's analytic tools can help probe this further. There is
one other promising line of inquiry that can fruitfully combine TWAIL and CRT
analytical tools. This is in exploring how we can help uncover our understanding
of the manner in which national security laws and policies in the United States
racialize Muslims and other people of color. 191 This requires investigating these
and other connections between domestic and international law,19 2 because-as

188.

Ol le Njogo 5 L.R.K. at 97.
J. RICHARDSON III, THE

ORIGINS OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw (2008).
190. An incomplete list includes Henry J. Richardson, III, U.S. Hegemony, Race, and Oil in Deciding
UnitedNationsSecurity CouncilResolution 1441 on Iraq, 17 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 27 (2003);
Henry J. Richardson III, The Gulf Crisis and African-American Interests Under International
Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 42 (1993); Ruth Gordon, Racing U.S. ForeignPolicy, 17 NAT'L BLACK L.J.
1 (2002); and Gordon, supra note 165.
191. One classic TWAIL inspired piece of scholarship is Ileana M. Porras, On Terrorism: Reflections
on Violence and the Outlaw, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 119 (1994). See also Li,supra note 47. Li placed
Muslims not only at the center of his narrative on the Global War on Terror, but also in the
middle of what all the analysis of Balkan wars referred to as a European war. Id. at 7-9 (noting
that the book "seeks a broader horizon that takes into account global hierarchies of race ... by
highlighting the region's [Europe's] links to the darker-skinned peoples to the south and
east").. He further noted that the extreme visibility of detention in places like Guantanamo
not only denied the United States the flexibility in its Global War on Terror, but also brought
the United States' allies on board as the jailers who in turn helped to sustain that war. Id.
Darryl Li also expanded our understanding of the global war on terror by highlighting the
universalist visions of pan-Islamism advanced by jihadists. Id. at 10.
192. Chantal Thomas, Causes of Inequality in the International Economic Order: Critical Race
Theory and PostcolonialDevelopment, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 13 (1999);
189.
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Amna Akbar has argued-there is no domestic law without international law.193
Such an analysis of racialization would go beyond analysis of legal doctrine in
domestic and international law to focus on how these regimes are constituted by
racialized assumptions and presuppositions, sometimes more obvious than
others. 194 In addition, such scholarship could inquire into the racialized histories
and historical inequalities between Whites and non-White groups, as well as
within and between these groups, within regimes of national security,
immigration, and citizenship. Indeed, CRT and TWAIL scholarship in
international law is increasingly beginning to focus on such issues. For example,
it examines how the nonself-executing doctrine embraced in U.S. courts to
foreclose the application ofinternational law was designed to limit the scrutiny not
only of slavery, but also of segregation, lynching 195 and, most recently and
environmental racism. 196 In a rare win, circumventing the nonself-executing
doctrine that has prevent United Nations treaties and human rights machinery
from scrutinizing conduct within the United States, in June 2020 voted to establish
an independent commission of inquiry to establish the facts and circumstances
related to systemic police violence in the United States and elsewhere following the
murder of George Floyd.197 The promise of such an analysis that examines the

193.
194.

195.

196.

197.

Chantal Thomas, CriticalRace Theory and PostcolonialDevelopment Theory: Observationson
Methodology, 45 VILL. L. REv. 1195, 1218 (2000) (tracing race in the context of international
economic law); see James Thuo Gathii, Retelling Good Governance Narratives on Africa's
Economic and PoliticalPredicaments: Continuities and Discontinuities in Legal Outcomes
Between Markets and States, 45 ViLL. L. REv. 971, 1010 (2000) (tracing the racially and
culturally constitutive aspects of market restructuring under the aegis of neoliberalism in the
1990s in Africa).
See Amna Akbar, NationalSecurity's Broken Windows, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 834,848 (2015).
Lat-Crit theory has undertaken some important work in this area. See, e.g., Gil Gott, The Devil
We Know: RacialSubordinationandNationalSecurityLaw, 50 ViLL. L. REv. 1073, 1076 (2005);
Gil Gott, A Tale of New Precedents:JapaneseAmerican Internment as ForeignAffairs Law, 40
B.C. L. REv. 179,265 (1998).
Henry J. Richardson III, ExcludingRace Strategiesfrom InternationalLegal History: The SelfExecuting Treaty Doctrineand the Southern Africa TripartiteAgreement, 45 VILL. L. REv. 1091,
1099 (2000).
Carmen G. Gonzalez, Environmental Racism, American Exceptionalism, and Cold War
Human Rights, 26 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 281, 284 (2017), (discussing Mossville
EnvironmentalAction Now v. UnitedStates, an environmental racism case pending before the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as of 2017, and arguing that the United States'
refusal to sign human rights treaties, its extensive use of reservations, understandings, and
declarations to limit the application of the treaties it does sign, and the judicially created
distinction between self-executing and nonself-executing treaties make domestic enforcement
impossible).
In its June 2020 Resolution A/HRC/ 43/L.50, the United Nations Human Rights Council
decided to:
establish an independent international commission of inquiry, to be appointed
by the President of the Human Rights Council, to establish the facts and
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racialized limits of the nonself-executing doctrine is that it counters mainstream
foreign relations doctrinal scholarship that renders race and identity invisible. The
power of combining TWAIL and CRT lenses would be to unearth how rules of
international and foreign relations law are mobilized in seemingly race neutral
terms to privilege the interests of western states, White elites, and private capital at
the expense of peoples of color, their territories, and their interests. 198
Finally, unlike TWAIL, CRT has largely not been concerned with the
economic underpinnings of the racial state. 199 By contrast, a major focus of
TWAIL scholarship is on the economic relationships between former colonies and
their metropolitan powers, 2.. and the postcolonial stakes in how development
programs from modernization to neoliberalism, and beyond, have been
constructed to favor the interests of northern industrialized economies and the
elites of the Third World.2 01 For example, some recent TWAIL scholarship traces
the origins of customary international law to this history of capitalism.2 02 The
recent focus on racial capitalism2 03 in law and political economy within the

circumstances relating to the systemic racism, alleged violations of international
human rights law and abuses against Africans and people of African descent
in the United States of America and other parts of the world recently affected by
law enforcement agencies, especially those incidents that resulted in the deaths
of Africans and of people of African descent, with a view to bringing
perpetrators to justice ....
U.N. H.R.C. Res. A/HRC/43/L.50., at 3 (June 17, 2020). See also Yasmin Sooka & Christoper
Gevers, FW De Klerk Has a Case to Answer, INDEP. ONLINE (July 4, 2020),
https://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/analysis/fw-de-klerk-has-a-case-to-answer50449267?fbclid=IwARiQqNcN_0sWM9Zvkn_1I2PJ2d10SP5058RgQC96_FTWc4BaSi6
wi43MQ [https://perma.cc/3DU9-F5WN].
198. Notably, an important new field of comparative foreign relations law has emerged. A
recent book with 46 chapters does not contain a single chapter or sustained analysis of
issues of identity and/or race even though the U.S. Foreign Relations paradigm is the defining
framework for the book. See THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE FOREIGN RELATIONS

199.
200.

LAW (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2019).
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in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE THIRD WORLD: RESHAPING JUSTICE 255 (Richard Falk,
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RESTRUCTURING: LAW, DISTRIBUTION AND GENDER IN MARKET REFORM (2002); MICHAEL
FAKHRI, SUGAR AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (2014).
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United States academy, in addition to the work that TWAILers have done, is
something from which CRT can learn.
CONCLUSION

This exploratory Article has argued that while CRT and TWAIL provide a set
of analytical tools that converge in how they focus on identity and race, each of
them provides possibilities that could enhance and enrich the other. After
outlining the convergences and divergences in how TWAIL and CRT discuss
race and identity in Part I, Part II of the Article explored how analysis of racial
subordination, intersectionality, multidimensionality, and essentialism from CRT
could offer TWAIL pathways to focus more sharply on race. Part III of the Article
argued that TWAIL's focus on racialization of empire offers CRT possibilities for
exploring the United States as a colonial and imperial power. Using the example
of Puerto Rico, one ofthe United States' colonial possessions, I argued that TWAIL
offers a fruitful framework for understanding similar forms of colonial empire
engaged in by European powers in the non-European world. Further, a TWAIL
analysis offers potential for probing the nature of the U.S. empire embedded in
U.S. foreign relations law. TWAIL scholars have only partially explored the
racialized nature of U.S. foreign relations law, and therefore much potential
remains to probe that field that is currently dominated by doctrinal analysis that
does not investigate its imperial nature and character.
Thus, the first major argument advanced in this Article is as follows. Just as
slavery dehumanized Black people as degenerate and outside the boundaries of
humanity in the construction of the United States as a White racial state,
European/White international law was constructed to relegate non-European
peoples who were considered to live outside the bounds of humanity and therefore
outside of sovereignty. The agenda of tracking connections across historical
periods and across different geographical locations that show "repeating and
structurally similar domestic political and legal agendas""2 -such as the Americas
and Africa-does not often center race and identity in its explorations of global
ordering. The potential and power of TWAIL/CRT collaboration is that it would
go beyond merely tracking connections between different colonies and repeating
governance agendas and techniques, because it would provide a very sharp lens of
tracing issues of race and identity in imperial histories, transnational histories, and
histories of the global.

204. Lauren Benton, Beyond Anachronism: HistoriesoflnternationalLaw and GlobalLegalPolitics,
21 J. HIST. INT'L L. 7, 30 (2019).
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The major claim made here, then, is that issues of race and identity have so
far been underemphasized, understudied, and undertheorized in mainstream
international law as well as by historians of empire.2 05 While this Article notes that
notions about race have been shifted across time and location, it has proceeded
from the premise that race as function of power has, since the eighteenth century,
"become a dominant lens through which humans see and understand
[themselves] ."206 TWAIL and CRT could learn about how to trace the centrality of
race from the subaltern scholars whose scholarship has put the "'politics of
difference'-racial, class, gender, ethnic, national, and so forth"-at the center of
their analysis. 207 Like subaltern scholars, TWAIL and CRT are well-positioned
to continue to contribute to the study of the racial dimensions of their fields and
to move their respective fields forward. These inquiries will generate insights,
such as how the privileging of Europe or the West/the United States has
generated and continues to generate norms and practices that structurally
subordinate those outside the Europe/the West/the United States in ways that
institutionalize hierarchies of race, class, and gender. Without such sustained
inquiries, the integral role of race in constituting both domestic and international
law will continue to be understudied and misunderstood.2 0 s
Ultimately, TWAIL and CRT can learn from each other as critical
movements. In addition, both can learn from each other on how to deal with
pushback and backlash from mainstream and conservative scholarly and political
movements or when theirrespective scholarship crosses disciplinary fields into the
headwinds of debates in other fields.2 09 This collaboration is long overdue. Take,

205. Notable exceptions among historians include Radhika Mongia. See, e.g., MONGIA, supra
note 170.
206. Omar H. Ali, Constructing Race in World History, OUPBLOG (Feb. 26, 2016),
https://blog.oup.com/2016/02/race-world-history [https://perma.cc/7H48-EDNU].
207. Gyan Prakash, WritingPost-OrientalistHistories of the Third World: Perspectivesfrom Indian
Historiography,32 COMPAR. STUD. Soc'Y &HIST. 383,406 (1990).
208. An example of the utility of bringing race into thinking about global and domestic studies is
CHARLES W. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT (1997) (arguing that the racial contract has

provided the theoretical architecture justifying an entire history of European atrocity against
non-Whites, from David Hume's and Immanuel Kant's claims that Blacks had inferior
cognitive power, to the Holocaust, to the kind of imperialism in Asia that was demonstrated by
the Vietnam War).
209. For example, Lauren Benton repeatedly refers to Third World Approaches to International
Law as "so-called TWAIL," thereby revealing a ratherdismissive attitude as to whether or not
TWAIL should be recognized as an approach to international law. Benton, supra note 204.
She noted, "Orford's position is presented as a defence [sic]of the so-called TWAIL school
(Third World Approaches to International Law), best represented by Anghie, Antony.
Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of InternationalLaw (Cambridge University Press,
2005)." Id. at 11 n.7. "The somewhat disconnected follow up to some of the arguments of socalled TWAIL scholars is an example." Id. at 24.
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for example, the potential for a sustained research agenda that examines the
intersection of the United States' domestic and foreign policies through the lens of
race. While there are scholars such as Henry Richardson III and Ruth Gordon, as
noted earlier, whose scholarship has focused on this intersection, much
remains to be done. Scholars outside of international law have done some great
work that could inspire a new generation of scholarship.210 Finally, both could
also learn from each other about how best to build alliances between themselves
as well as with other critical movements. This alliance is necessary to counter the
all-too-often mainstream efforts to provincialize, define, and box critical
approaches-especially when they delve into issues of race and identity-as
marginal and irrelevant, rather than as significant contributions that challenge
expand their respective fields.
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